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Abstract
We propose four axiomatic systems for intuitionistic linear temporal
logic and show that each of these systems is sound for a class of structures
based either on Kripke frames or on dynamic topological systems. Our
topological semantics features a new interpretation for the ‘henceforth’
modality that is a natural intuitionistic variant of the classical one. Using
the soundness results, we show that the four logics obtained from the
axiomatic systems are distinct. Finally, we show that when the language
is restricted to the ‘henceforth’-free fragment, the set of valid formulas for
the relational and topological semantics coincide.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic logic enjoys a myriad of interpretations based on computation, in-
formation or topology, making it a natural framework to reason about dynamic
processes in which these phenomena play a crucial role. In the areas of non-
monotonic reasoning, knowledge representation (KR), and artificial intelligence,
intuitionistic and intermediate logics have played an important role within the
successful answer set programming (ASP) [6] paradigm for practical KR. Great
part of its success is due to the impressive advances in implementation of efficient
solvers [28, 18] and its use in a wide range of domains such as computational
biology [20], spatial reasoning [38], or configuration [19].
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Central to this paradigm is equilibrium logic [35], which characterises the
ASP semantics in terms of the intermediate logic of here and there [21] plus
a minimisation criterion. Such a definition has led to several extensions of
modal ASP [8, 14] that are supported by intuitionistic-based modal logics like
temporal here and there [4] and are crucial when characterising the theorem of
strong equivalence [30, 13, 7].
There are also several potential applications for intuitionistic temporal log-
ics that are unrelated to ASP. Davies [9] has suggested an extension of the
Curry-Howard isomorphism [12] to partially evaluated programs by adding a
next-time operator ◦. Maier [31] observed that an intuitionistic temporal logic
with infinitary operators including a henceforth operator  could be used for
reasoning about safety and liveness conditions in possibly-terminating reactive
systems. Fernández-Duque [15] has suggested that a logic with ‘eventually’ can
be used to provide a decidable framework in which to reason about topologi-
cal dynamics. It is thus surprising that the computational and proof-theoretic
properties of these logics are far from being well-understood.
State-of-the-art. There have, however, been some notable efforts in this di-
rection. Kojima and Igarashi [23] endowed Davies’ logic with Kripke semantics
and provided a complete deductive system. Bounded-time versions of logics with
henceforth were later studied by Kamide and Wansing [22]. Both use seman-
tics based on Simpson’s bi-relational models for intuitionistic modal logic [36].
Since then, Balbiani and the authors have shown that temporal here-and-there
is decidable and enjoys a natural axiomatization [4]. They have identified two
natural, semantically-defined intuitionistic temporal logics, ITLe and ITLp,
studied bisimulations for these logics [3], and shown ITLe to be decidable [5].
However, the decision procedure does not provide a natural axiomatization, and
moreover the decidability of ITLp remains open, despite the latter logic being
attractive due to it validating the familiar Fischer Servi axioms [17].
Topological semantics for intuitionistic modal and tense logics have also
been studied by Davoren et al. [11, 10], and Kremer suggested an intuitionistic
variant of LTL [26] similar to dynamic topological logic (DTL) [2, 27]. DTL
is a tri-modal system which gained interest due to its potential applications to
automated theorem proving for topological dynamics, but was later shown to be
undecidable [24]. On the other hand, the decidability of Kremer’s intuitionistic
temporal logic remains open, but Fernández-Duque has shown that a logic with
‘eventually’ ♦ instead of  is decidable [15]. Both intuitionistic temporal logics
can be seen as sublogics of DTL via the Gödel-Tarski translation [37].
Our contribution. The above decidability results for intuitionistic temporal
logics are based on semantical methods. The primary goal of this paper is to
lay the groundwork for an axiomatic treatment of intuitionistic linear temporal
logics. We will introduce a ‘minimal’ intuitionistic temporal logic, ITL0, defined
by adding standard axioms of LTL to intuitionistic propositional logic. We
also consider additional Fischer Servi axioms and a ‘constant domain’ axiom
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(p ∨ q) → p ∨ ♦q. Combining these, we obtain four intuitionistic temporal
logics. As we will see, each of these logics is sound for a class of structures; the
two logics with the constant domain axiom are sound for the class of dynamic
posets, and the Fischer Servi axioms correspond to backwards-confluence of the
transition function.
The constant domain axiom is not derivable from the others, and to show
this, we will consider topological semantics for intuitionistic temporal logic. As
our axioms involve both ♦ and , we would like to be able to interpret both
tenses. Kremer observed that his semantics for  do not satisfy some key
validities of LTL, namely p → ◦p,  ◦ p → ◦p, and p → p. This
makes a proof-theoretic treatment of Kremer’s logic difficult, as ϕ → ◦ϕ is
one of the defining properties of  and it is hard to tell what weaker principle
could replace it.
To avoid this issue, we propose an alternative interpretation for . Our
approach is natural from an algebraic perspective, as we define the interpretation
of ϕ via a greatest fixed point in the Heyting algebra of open sets. On the
other hand, this fixed point is not definable in the classical language and hence
we no longer obtain a sub-logic of DTL. We will show that dynamic topological
systems provide semantics for the logics without the constant domain axiom,
from which we conclude the independence of the latter. Moreover, we show that
the Fischer Servi axioms are valid for the class of open dynamical topological
systems.
The constant domain axiom shows that the {♦,}-logic of dynamic posets is
different from that of dynamic topological systems. We show via an alternative
axiom that the {◦,}-logics are also different. On the other hand, our main
technical contribution is a proof that the {◦,♦}-logics coincide, for which we
use quasimodels, introduced in the context of intuitionistic temporal logics by
Fernández-Duque [15]. This suggests that a completeness proof as in [16] could
be adapted to give a complete deductive calculus for the {◦,♦}-logic over both
the class of dynamic posets and the class of dynamic topological systems.
Layout. Section 2 introduces the syntax and the four axiomatic systems we
propose for intuitionistic temporal logic. Section 3 reviews dynamic topolog-
ical systems, which are used in Section 4 to provide semantics for our formal
language. Section 5 shows that each of the four logics is sound for a class of
dynamical systems. These soundness results are used in Section 6 to show that
the four logics are pairwise distinct. Section 7 reviews non-deterministic quasi-
models, which are used in Section 8 to show that the topological and the Kripke
{◦,♦}-logics coincide. Finally, Section 9 lists some open questions.
2 Syntax and axiomatics
In this section we will introduce four natural intuitionistic temporal logics. All
of the axioms have appeared either in the intuitionistic logic, the temporal logic,
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or the intuitionistic modal logic literature. They will be based on the language
of linear temporal logic, as defined next.
Fix a countably infinite set P of ‘propositional variables’. The language L
of intuitionistic (linear) temporal logic ITL is given by the grammar
⊥ | p | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | ◦ ϕ | ♦ϕ | ϕ,
where p ∈ P. As usual, we use ¬ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ → ⊥ and ϕ ↔ ψ as a
shorthand for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). We read ◦ as ‘next’, ♦ as ‘eventually’, and
 as ‘henceforth’. Given any formula ϕ, we denote the set of subformulas of ϕ
by sub(ϕ) and its length by |ϕ|. The language L♦ is defined as the sublanguage
of L without the modality . Similarly, L is the language without ♦.
We begin by establishing our basic axiomatization. It is obtained by adapt-
ing the standard axioms and inference rules of LTL [29], as well as their dual
versions, to propositional intuitionistic logic [32]. The logic ITL0 is the least
set of L-formulas closed under the following rules and axioms.
(i) All intuitionistic tautologies.
(ii) ¬ ◦ ⊥
(iii) ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ);
(iv) ◦ (ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (◦ϕ ∨ ◦ψ);
(v) ◦ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ);
(vi)  (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ);
(vii)  (ϕ→ ψ)→ (♦ϕ→ ♦ψ);
(viii) ♦ (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ);
(ix) ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ◦ϕ;
(x) ϕ ∨ ◦♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ;
(xi) from ϕ→ ◦ϕ infer ϕ→ ϕ;
(xii) from ◦ϕ→ ϕ infer ♦ϕ→ ϕ;
(xiii) from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ;
(xiv) from ϕ infer ◦ϕ.
However, modal intuitionistic logics typically involve additional axioms, due
to Fischer Servi [17], in order to strengthen the ties with first-order intuitionistic
logic. Thus we may also consider logics with the latter; for FS◦, recall that ◦ is
self-dual.
(FS◦(ϕ, ψ)) (◦ϕ→ ◦ψ)→ ◦ (ϕ→ ψ) ,
(FS♦(ϕ, ψ)) (♦ϕ→ ψ)→  (ϕ→ ψ) .
Finally, we consider additional axioms reminiscent of constant domain ax-
ioms in first-order intuitionistic logic. As we will see, in the context of intuition-
istic temporal logics, these axioms separate Kripke semantics from the more
general topological semantics.
4
(CD(ϕ, ψ)) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ ϕ ∨ ♦ψ,
(BI(ϕ, ψ)) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧(◦ψ → ψ)→ ϕ ∨ ψ.
Here, CD stands for ‘constant domain’ and BI for ‘backward induction’. The
axiom BI is meant to be a ♦-free approximation to CD, as witnessed by the
following.
Proposition 1. ITL0 ⊢ CD(p, q)→ BI(p, q).
Proof. We reason within ITL0. Assume that (1) CD(p, q) holds, along with (2)(◦q → q)
and (3) (p∨ q). From (1) and (3) we obtain p∨ ♦q, which together with (2)
and axiom (xii) gives us p ∨ q, as needed.
With this, we define the following logics:
ITL
FS ≡ ITL0 + FS◦ + FS♦,
ITL
CD ≡ ITL0 +CD,
ITL
1 ≡ ITLFS + ITLCD.
We are also interested in logics over sublanguages of L. For any logic Λ defined
above, let Λ♦ be the logic obtained by restricting all rules and axioms to L♦,
and let Λ be defined by restricting similarly to L, except that when CD is
an axiom of Λ, we add the axiom BI to Λ.
3 Dynamic topological systems
The four logics defined above are pairwise distinct. We will show this by intro-
ducing semantics for each of them. They will be based on dynamic topological
systems (or dynamical systems for short), which, as was observed in [15], gen-
eralize their Kripke semantics [5].
3.1 Topological spaces and continuous functions
Let us recall the definition of a topological space [33]:
Definition 1. A topological space is a pair (X, T ) , where X is a set and T a
family of subsets of X satisfying
(a) ∅, X ∈ T ;
(b) if U, V ∈ T then U ∩ V ∈ T , and
(c) if O ⊆ T then
⋃
O ∈ T .
The elements of T are called open sets.
5
If x ∈ X , a neighbourhood of x is an open set U ⊆ X such that x ∈ U . Given
a set A ⊆ X , its interior, denoted A◦, is the largest open set contained in A. It
is defined formally by
A◦ =
⋃
{U ∈ T : U ⊆ A} . (1)
Dually, we define the closure A as X \ (X \ A)◦; this is the smallest closed set
containing A.
If (X, T ) is a topological space, a function S : X → X is continuous if,
whenever U ⊆ X is open, it follows that S−1[U ] is open. The function S is open
if, whenever V ⊆ X is open, then so is S[V ]. An open, continuous function is
an interior map, and a bijective interior map is a homeomorphism.
A dynamical system is then a topological space equipped with a continuous
function:
Definition 2. A dynamical (topological) system is a triple X = (X, T , S) such
that (X, T ) is a topological space and S : X → X is continuous. We say that X
is invertible if S is a homeomorphism, i.e., S−1 is also a continuous function,
and open if S is an interior map.
3.2 Up-set topologies
Topological spaces generalize posets in the following way. Let F = (W,4) be
a poset; that is, W is any set and 4 is a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric
relation on W . To see F as a topological space, define ↑w = {v : w 4 v} . Then
consider the topology T4 on W given by setting U ⊆W to be open if and only
if, whenever w ∈ U , we have ↑w ⊆ U . A topology of this form is a up-set
topology [1]. The interior operator on such a topological space can be computed
by
A◦ = {w ∈ W : ↑w ⊆ A}; (2)
i.e., w lies on the interior of A if whenever v < w, it follows that v ∈ A.
Throughout this text we will often identify partial orders with their corre-
sponding topologies, and many times do so tacitly. In particular, a dynamical
system generated by a poset is called a dynamic poset. It will be useful to
characterize the continuous and open functions on posets:
Lemma 1. Consider a poset (W,4) and a function S : W →W . Then,
1. S is continuous with respect to the up-set topology if and only if, whenever
w 4 w′, it follows that S(w) 4 S(w′), and
2. S is open with respect to the up-set topology if whenever S(w) 4 v, there
is w′ ∈ W such that w 4 w′ and S(w′) = v.
These are confluence properties common in multi-modal logics; note that in
[5] we referred to maps satisfying the two conditions as persistent maps.
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Figure 1: On a dynamic poset the above diagrams can always be completed if
S is continuous or open, respectively. Open, continuous maps on a poset are
persistent.
4 Semantics
In this section we will see how dynamical systems can be used to provide a
natural intuitionistic semantics for the language of linear temporal logic.
4.1 Basic definitions
Formulas are interpreted as open subspaces of a dynamical system. Each propo-
sitional variable p is assigned an open set JpK, and then J·K is defined recursively
for more complex formulas according to the following:
Definition 3. Given a dynamical system X = (X, T , S), a valuation on X is
a function J·K : L → T such that:
J⊥K = ∅
Jϕ ∧ ψK = JϕK ∩ JψK
Jϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψK
Jϕ→ ψK =
(
(X \ JϕK) ∪ JψK
)◦
J◦ϕK = S−1 JϕK
J♦ϕK =
⋃
n≥0 S
−n JϕK
JϕK =
⋃ {
U ∈ T : S[U ] ⊆ U ⊆ JϕK
}
A tuple M = (X, T , S, J·K) consisting of a dynamical system with a valuation is
a dynamic topological model, and if T is generated by a partial order, we will
say that M is a dynamic poset model.
All of the semantic clauses are standard from either intuitionistic or temporal
logic, with the exception of that for ϕ, which we discuss in greater detail below.
It is not hard to check by structural induction on ϕ that JϕK is uniquely defined
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given any assignment of the propositional variables to open sets, and that JϕK
is always open.
In practice, it is convenient to have a ‘pointwise’ characterization of Defini-
tion 3. For a model M = (X, T , S, J·K), x ∈ X and ϕ ∈ L, we write M, x |= ϕ
if x ∈ JϕK, and M |= ϕ if JϕK = X . Then, in view of (1), given formulas ϕ
and ψ, M, x |= ϕ→ ψ if and only if there is a neighbourhood U of x such that
for all y ∈ U , if M, y |= ϕ then M, y |= ψ; note that this is a special case of
neighbourhood semantics [34].
Using (2), this can be simplified somewhat in the case that T is generated
by a partial order 4:
Proposition 2. If (X,4, S, J·K) is a dynamic poset model, x ∈ X, and ϕ, ψ are
formulas, then M, x |= ϕ→ ψ if and only if whenever y < x and M, y |= ϕ, it
follows that M, y |= ψ.
This is the standard relational interpretation of implication, and thus topo-
logical semantics are a generalization of the usual Kripke semantics.
4.2 The topological ‘henceforth’
Now let us discuss the topological interpretation of ‘henceforth’, which is the
main novelty in our semantics. In classical temporal logic, JϕK is the largest set
contained in JϕK which is closed under S. In our semantics, JϕK is the greatest
open set which is closed under S. From this perspective, our interpretation
is the natural intuitionistic variant of the classical one. If M, x |= ϕ, this
fact is witnessed by an open, S-invariant neighbourhood of x, where U ⊆ X is
S-invariant if S[U ] ⊆ U .
Proposition 3. If (X, T , S, J·K) is a dynamic topological model, x ∈ X, and ϕ
is any formula, then M, x |= ϕ if and only if there is an S-invariant neigh-
bourhood U of x such that for all y ∈ U , M, y |= ϕ.
In fact, the open, S-invariant sets form a topology; that is, the family of
S-invariant open sets is closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions.
This topology is coarser than T , in the sense that every S-invariant open set is
(tautologically) open. Thus  can itself be seen as an interior operator based
on a coarsening of T , and JϕK is always an S-invariant open set.
Example 1. As usual, the real number line is denoted by R and we assume that
it is equipped with the standard topology, where U ⊆ R is open if and only if it
is a union of intervals of the form (a, b). Consider a dynamical system based on
R with S : R → R given by S(x) = 2x. We claim that for any model M based
on (R, S) and any formula ϕ, M, 0 |= ϕ if and only if M |= ϕ.
To see this, note that one implication is obvious since R is open and S-
invariant, so if JϕK = R it follows that M, 0 |= ϕ. For the other implication,
assume that M, 0 |= ϕ, so that there is an S-invariant, open U ⊆ JϕK with
0 ∈ U . It follows from U being open that for some ε > 0, (−ε, ε) ⊆ U . Now,
let x ∈ R, and let n be large enough so that |2−nx| < ε. Then, 2−nx ∈ U , and
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since U is S-invariant, x = Sn(2−nx) ∈ U . Since x was arbitrary, U = R, and
it follows that M |= ϕ.
On the other hand, suppose that 0 < a < x and (a,∞) ⊆ JϕK. Then, (a,∞)
is open and S-invariant, so it follows that x ∈ JϕK. Hence in this case we do
not require that JϕK = R. Similarly, if x < a < 0 and (−∞, a) ⊆ JϕK, we readily
obtain x ∈ JϕK.
4.3 The relational ‘henceforth’
As was the case for implication, our interpretation for  becomes familiar when
restricted to Kripke semantics.
Lemma 2. Let M = (W,4, S, J·K) be any dynamic poset model, w ∈ W and
ϕ ∈ L. Then, the following are equivalent:
(a) M, w |= ϕ;
(b) w ∈
(⋂
n<ω S
−n JϕK
)◦
;
(c) for all n < ω, M, Sn(w) |= ϕ.
Proof. First we prove that (a) implies (b). Assume that M, w |= ϕ, so that
there is an S-invariant neighbourhood U of w with U ⊆ JϕK. To see that
w ∈
(⋂
n<ω S
−n JϕK
)◦
, we must show that if v < w, then v ∈
⋂
n<ω S
−n JϕK.
So fix such a v and n < ω. Since U is S-invariant, Sn(w) ∈ U , and since
Sn(v) < Sn(w) and U is open, Sn(v) ∈ U , as needed. Thus v ∈
⋂
n<ω S
−n JϕK,
and since v < w was arbitrary, (b) holds.
That (b) implies (c) is immediate from(⋂
n<ω
S−n JϕK
)◦
⊆
⋂
n<ω
S−n JϕK ,
so it remains to show that (c) implies (a). Suppose that for all n < ω,
M, Sn(w) |= ϕ, and let U =
⋃
n<ω ↑S
n(w). That the set U is open follows
from each ↑Sn(w) being open and unions of opens being open. If v ∈ U ,
then v < Sn(w) for some n < ω and hence by upwards persistence, from
M, Sn(w) |= ϕ we obtain M, v |= ϕ; moreover, S(v) < Sn+1(w) so S(v) ∈ U .
Since v ∈ U was arbitrary, we conclude that U is S-invariant and U ⊆ JϕK.
Thus U witnesses that M, w |= ϕ.
Remark 1. In fact, Kremer [26] uses (b) as the definition of JϕK. However,
as we mentioned in the introduction, even our minimal axiomatic system ITL0
is not sound for such an interpretation over arbitrary dynamical systems.
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5 Soundness
Recall that if M = (X, T , S, J·K) is any dynamic topological model and ϕ ∈ L
is any formula, we write M |= ϕ if JϕK = X . Similarly, if X = (X, T , S) is a
dynamical system, we write X |= ϕ if for any valuation J·K on X , we have that
(X , J·K) |= ϕ. Finally, if Ω is a class of structures, we write Ω |= ϕ if for every
A ∈ Ω, A |= ϕ, in which case we say that ϕ is valid on Ω.
For purposes of this discussion, a logic may be any set Λ ⊆ L, and we may
write Λ ⊢ ϕ instead of ϕ ∈ Λ. Then, Λ is sound for a class of structures Ω if,
whenever Λ ⊢ ϕ, it follows that Ω |= ϕ.
In this section we will show that the four logics we have considered are
sound for semantics based on different classes of dynamic topological systems
(including dynamic preorders). For this, the following simple observation will
be useful.
Lemma 3. If M = (X, T , S, J·K) is any model and ϕ, ψ ∈ L, then M |= ϕ→ ψ
if and only if JϕK ⊆ JψK.
Proof. If JϕK ⊆ JψK then (X \ JϕK) ∪ JψK = X , so Jϕ→ ψK =
(
(X \ JϕK) ∪
JψK
)◦
= X◦ = X. Otherwise, there is z ∈ JϕK such that z /∈ JψK, so that
z /∈
(
(X \ JϕK) ∪ JψK
)◦
, i.e. z /∈ Jϕ→ ψK.
5.1 Soundness of ITL0
With this in mind, let us now show that our minimal logic is sound for the class
of all dynamical systems.
Theorem 1. ITL0 is sound for the class of dynamical systems.
Proof. Let M = (X, T , S, J·K) be any dynamical topological model; we must
check that all the axioms (i)-(x) are valid onM and all rules (xi)-(xiv) preserve
validity. Note that all intuitionistic tautologies are valid due to the soundness for
topological semantics [32]. Many of the other axioms can be checked routinely,
so we focus only on those axioms involving the continuity of S or the semantics
for .
(v) Suppose that x ∈ J◦(ϕ→ ψ)K. Then, S(x) ∈ Jϕ→ ψK. Since S is continuous
and Jϕ→ ψK is open, U = S−1 Jϕ→ ψK is a neighbourhood of x. Then, for
y ∈ U , if y ∈ J◦ϕK, it follows that S(y) ∈ JϕK ∩ Jϕ→ ψK, so that S(y) ∈ JψK
and y ∈ J◦ψK. Since y ∈ U was arbitrary, x ∈ J◦ϕ→ ◦ψK, thus J◦(ϕ→ ψ)K ⊆
J◦ϕ→ ◦ψK, and by Lemma 3 (which from now on we will use without mention),
(v) is valid on M.
(vi) Observe that J(ϕ→ ψ)K is an S-invariant open subset of Jϕ→ ψK. Simi-
larly, JϕK is an S-invariant open subset of JϕK. Let
U = J(ϕ→ ψ)K ∩ JϕK .
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Since U is open, it suffices to prove that U ⊆ JψK. Moreover, U is S-
invariant, therefore it suffices to prove that U ⊆ JψK, which is direct because
U ⊆ Jϕ→ ψK ∩ JϕK and Jϕ→ ψK ⊆ (X \ JϕK) ∪ JψK.
(ix) Suppose that x ∈ JϕK, and let U ⊆ JϕK be an S-invariant neighbourhood of
x. Then, x ∈ U , so x ∈ JϕK. Moreover, U is also an S-invariant neighbourhood
of S(x), so S(x) ∈ JϕK and thus x ∈ J◦ϕK. We conclude that x ∈ Jϕ ∧ ◦ϕK.
(xi) If ϕ → ◦ϕ is valid and x ∈ JϕK, then JϕK is open (by the intuitionistic
semantics) and S-invariant, since if y ∈ JϕK, from y ∈ Jϕ→ ◦ϕK we obtain
S(y) ∈ JϕK. It follows that JϕK is an S-invariant neighbourhood of x, so x ∈
JϕK.
5.2 Soundness of stronger logics
The additional axioms we have considered are valid over specific classes of dy-
namical systems. Specifically, the constant domain axiom is valid for the class
of dynamic posets, while the Fischer Servi axioms are valid for the class of open
systems. Let us begin by discussing the former in more detail.
Theorem 2. ITLCD and ITLCD are sound for the class of dynamic posets.
Proof. Let M = (X,4, S, J·K) be a dynamic poset model; in view of Theorem
1, it only remains to check that CD and BI are valid on M. However, by
Proposition 1, BI is a consequence of CD, so we only check the latter.
(CD(ϕ, ψ)) Suppose that x ∈ J(ϕ ∨ ψ)K, but x 6∈ JϕK. Then, in view of
Lemma 2, for some n ≥ 0, Sn(x) 6∈ JϕK. It follows that Sn(x) ∈ JψK, so that
x ∈ J♦ψK.
Note that the relational semantics are used in an essential way, since Lemma
2 is not available in the topological setting. Now let’s turn our attention to the
Fischer Servi axioms.
Theorem 3. ITLFS is sound for the class of open dynamical systems.
Proof. Let M = (X, T , S, J·K) be a dynamical topological model where S is an
interior map. We check that axioms FS◦ and FS♦ are valid on M.
(FS◦) Suppose that x ∈ J◦ϕ→ ◦ψK, and let U ⊆ J◦ϕ→ ◦ψK be a neighbourhood
of x. Since S is open, V = S[U ] is a neighbourhood of S(x). Let y ∈ V ∩ JϕK,
and choose z ∈ U so that y = S(z). Then, z ∈ U ∩ J◦ϕK, so that z ∈ J◦ψK,
i.e. y ∈ JψK. Since y ∈ V was arbitrary, S(x) ∈ Jϕ→ ψK, and x ∈ J◦(ϕ→ ψ)K.
(FS♦) Suppose that x ∈ J♦ϕ→ ψK, and let U ⊆ J♦ϕ→ ψK be a neigh-
bourhood of x. Set V =
⋃
n<ω S
n[U ]; since S is open and unions of opens are
open, V is open as well. Moreover, V is clearly S-invariant, as if x ∈ V , then
x ∈ Sn[U ] for some n ≥ 0, so that S(x) ∈ Sn+1[U ] ⊆ V .
We claim that V ⊆ Jϕ→ ψK, from which we obtain a witness that M, x |=
(ϕ→ ψ). Suppose that y ∈ V ∩ JϕK. By the definition of V , y = Sn(z) for
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some n < ω and some z ∈ U . Then, z ∈ U ∩ J♦ϕK, so that z ∈ JψK. From this
we may choose an S-invariant neighbourhood Z ⊆ JψK of z. But y = Sn(z) ∈ Z
so that y ∈ JψK, and since y ∈ V was arbitrary we see that V ⊆ Jϕ→ ψK, as
needed.
As an easy consequence, we mention the following combination of Theo-
rems 2 and 3. Recall that dynamic posets with an interior map are also called
persistent.
Corollary 1. ITL1 and ITL1 are sound for the class of persistent dynamic
posets.
6 Independence
In this section we will use our soundness results to show that the four logics we
have considered are pairwise distinct.
6.1 Independence of the constant domain axioms
The formulas CD and BI separate Kripke semantics from the general topological
semantics.
Proposition 4. The formulas CD(p, q) and BI(p, q) are not valid over the class
of invertible dynamical systems based on R.
Proof. Define a model M on R, with S(x) = 2x, JpK = (−∞, 1) and JqK =
(0,∞). Clearly Jp ∨ qK = R, so that J(p ∨ q)K = R as well.
Let us see that M, 0 6|= CD(p, q). Since M, 0 |= (p ∨ q), it suffices to show
that M, 0 6|= p ∨ ♦q. It is clear that M, 0 6|= ♦q simply because Sn(0) = 0 6∈
JqK for all n. Meanwhile, by Example 1, M, 0 |= p if and only if JpK = R,
which is not the case. We conclude that M, 0 6|= CD(p, q).
To see that M, 0 6|= BI(p, q) we proceed similarly, where the only new ingre-
dient is observing thatM, 0 |= (◦q → q). But this follows easily from the fact
that if M, x |= ◦q, then x > 0 so that M, x |= q, hence J◦q → qK = R.
Corollary 2. ITLFS 6⊢ CD(p, q) and ITLFS 6⊢ BI(p, q).
Proof. By Theorem 3, ITLFS is sound for the class of open dynamical sys-
tems, but by Proposition 4, CD(p, q) is not valid on this class, hence ITLFS 6⊢
CD(p, q). That ITLFS 6⊢ BI(p, q) is obtained by the same reasoning.
6.2 Independence of the Fischer Servi axioms
The Fischer Servi axioms are also not valid in general, as shown in Boudou et
al. [3] (see Figure 2).
Proposition 5. FS◦(p, q) and FS♦(p, q) are not valid over the class of dynamic
posets.
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Figure 2: A dynamic poset model falsifying both Fischer Servi axioms. Propo-
sitional variables that are true on a point are displayed; only one point satisfies
p and no point satisfies q. It can readily be checked that FS◦(p, q) and FS♦(p, q)
fail on the highlighted point on the left. Note that S is continuous but not open,
as can easily be seen by comparing to Figure 1.
From this and the soundness of ITLFS (Theorem 3), we immediately obtain
that they are not derivable in ITL0.
Corollary 3. ITLCD 6⊢ FS◦(p, q) and ITL
CD 6⊢ FS♦(p, q).
The above independence results are sufficient to see that our four logics are
distinct.
Theorem 4. The logics ITL0, ITLFS, ITLCD and ITL1 are pairwise distinct,
as are ITL0, ITL
FS
 , ITL
CD
 and ITL
1
.
Proof. By Corollary 2 and the definition of ITLCD, CD(p, q) ∈ ITLCD\ITLFS;
similarly, by Corollary 3, FS◦(p, q) ∈ ITL
FS\ITLCD. Thus ITLFS and ITLCD
are incomparable, from which we conclude that ITL0, which is contained in
their intersection, is strictly smaller than either of them, while ITL1, which
contains their union, is strictly larger. The argument for the logics over L are
analogous, except that CD is replaced with BI.
7 Types and quasimodels
In this section we review non-deterministic quasimodels [15]. Quasimodels will
be our fundamental tool for passing from topological to Kripke semantics.
7.1 Two-sided types
Our presentation will differ slightly from that of [15], since it will be convenient
for us to use two-sided types, defined as follows.
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Definition 4. Let Φ−,Φ+ ⊆ L♦ be finite sets of formulas. We say that the pair
Φ = (Φ−; Φ+) is a two-sided type if:
1. Φ− ∩ Φ+ = ∅,
2. ⊥ 6∈ Φ+,
3. if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ+,
4. if ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ−, then ϕ ∈ Φ− or ψ ∈ Φ−,
5. if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ ∈ Φ+ or ψ ∈ Φ+,
6. if ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ−, then ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ−,
7. if ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ+, then either ϕ ∈ Φ− or ψ ∈ Φ+, and
8. if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ− then ϕ ∈ Φ−.
The set of finite two-sided types will be denoted T. Whenever Ξ is an expression
denoting a two-sided type, we write Ξ− and Ξ+ to denote its components.
We will consider two partial orders on T. We will write
(a) Φ 4T Ψ if Ψ
− ⊆ Φ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+, and
(b) Φ ⊑T Ψ if Φ
− = Ψ− and Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+.
If Φ is a two sided-type and Σ = Φ− ∪Φ+, we may say that Φ is a two-sided
Σ-type. The set of two-sided Σ-types will be denoted by TΣ.
Remark 2. Fernández-Duque [15] uses one-sided Σ-types, but it is readily
checked that a one-sided type Φ as defined there can be regarded as a two-sided
type Ψ by setting Ψ+ = Φ and Ψ− = Σ \ Φ. Henceforth we will write type
instead of two-sided type and explicitly write one-sided type when discussing
[15].
7.2 Quasimodels
Quasimodels are similar to models, except that valuations are replaced with a
labelling function ℓ. We first define the more basic notion of labelled frame.
Definition 5. A labelled frame is a triple F = (W,4, ℓ), where 4 is a partial
order on W and ℓ : W → T is such that
(a) whenever w 4 v it follows that ℓ(w) 4T ℓ(v), and
(b) whenever ϕ → ψ ∈ ℓ−(w), there is v < w such that ϕ ∈ ℓ+(v) and
ψ ∈ ℓ−(v),
where (ℓ−(v), ℓ+(v))
def
= ℓ(v).
We say that F satisfies ϕ ∈ L if ϕ ∈ ℓ+(w) for some w ∈ W , and that it
falsifies ϕ if ϕ ∈ ℓ−(w) for some w ∈ W . If ℓ(w) ∈ TΣ for all w ∈ W , we say
that F is a Σ-labelled frame.
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Labelled frames model only the intuitionistic aspect of the logic. For the
temporal dimension, let us define a new relation over types.
Definition 6. We define a relation ST⊆ T × T by Φ ST Ψ iff for all ϕ ∈ L:
(a) if ◦ϕ ∈ Φ+ then ϕ ∈ Ψ+,
(b) if ◦ϕ ∈ Φ− then ϕ ∈ Ψ−,
(c) if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ+, then ϕ ∈ Φ+ or ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ+, and
(d) if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ−, then ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ−.
Quasimodels are then defined as labelled frames with a suitable binary rela-
tion.
Definition 7. A quasimodel is a tuple Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) where (W,4, ℓ) is a
labelled frame and S is a binary relation over W that is
serial: for all w there is v such that w S v;
forward-confluent: if w 4 w′ and w S v, there is v′ such that v 4 v′ and
w′ S v′;
sensible: w S x implies ℓ(w) ST ℓ(x), and
ω-sensible: whenever ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ+(w), there are n ≥ 0 and v such that w Sn v
and ϕ ∈ ℓ+(v).
If (W,4, ℓ) is a Σ-labeled frame then Q is a Σ-quasimodel. If S is a function
then Q is deterministic.
The forward confluence condition plays the role of continuity in the non-
deterministic setting; indeed, if S is deterministic, then it is easy to see that S
is forward-confluent if and only if it is monotone, which as we have discussed, is
equivalent to continuity with respect to the up-set topology. In fact, determin-
istic quasimodels are essentially dynamic posets with a particular valuation, as
witnessed by the following version of the ‘truth lemma’:
Lemma 4. Let Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) be a deterministic quasimodel, and define a
valuation J·Kℓ on Q by setting JpKℓ = {w ∈ W : p ∈ ℓ+(w)} and extending to all
of L recursively. Then, for all formulas ϕ ∈ L♦ and for all w ∈ W ,
(1) if ϕ ∈ ℓ+(w) then w ∈ JϕKℓ, and
(2) if ϕ ∈ ℓ−(w) then w 6∈ JϕK
ℓ
.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. We must consider the following
cases.
(ϕ = p is an atom) Note that by definition of JpK
ℓ
, if p ∈ ℓ+(w) then w ∈ JpK
ℓ
and if p ∈ ℓ−(w) then p 6∈ ℓ+(w) so w 6∈ JpK
ℓ
.
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Forward Confluence
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v′
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Figure 3: If S is forward-confluent, then the above diagram can always be
completed.
(ϕ = ψ ∧ θ) Assume that ψ ∧ θ ∈ ℓ+(w). By Definition 4 it follows that
ψ ∈ ℓ+(w) and θ ∈ ℓ+(w). By induction hypothesis, w ∈ JψK
ℓ
and w ∈ JθK
ℓ
.
Therefore w ∈ Jψ ∧ θK
ℓ
.
If ψ∧θ ∈ ℓ−(w), by definition 4 it follows that either ψ ∈ ℓ−(w) or θ ∈ ℓ−(w).
By induction hypotheses we conclude that w 6∈ JψK
ℓ
or w 6∈ JθK
ℓ
. Therefore
w 6∈ Jψ ∧ θK
ℓ
.
(ϕ = ψ ∨ θ) This case is symmetric, but using the conditions for ∨.
(ϕ = ψ → θ) Assume first that ψ → θ ∈ ℓ+(w). Then for all y such that w 4 y,
by condition (a) of Definition 5, ψ → θ ∈ ℓ+(y). By condition 7 of Definition 4
and by induction hypothesis, y /∈ JψK
ℓ
or y ∈ JθK
ℓ
. Therefore, w ∈ Jψ → θK
ℓ
.
Now let us assume that ψ → θ ∈ ℓ−(w). By Definition 5 it follows that
there exists v ∈W such that w 4 v and ψ ∈ ℓ+(v) and θ ∈ ℓ−(v). By induction
hypothesis it follows that v ∈ JψK
ℓ
\ JθK
ℓ
, which means that w 6∈ Jψ → θK
ℓ
.
(ϕ = ◦ψ) Assume that ◦ψ ∈ ℓ+(w). Since S is sensible, ψ ∈ ℓ+(S(w)). By
induction hypothesis S(w) ∈ JψK
ℓ
. Therefore w ∈ J◦ψK
ℓ
. The case where
◦ψ ∈ ℓ−(w) is analogous.
(ϕ = ♦ψ) If ♦ψ ∈ ℓ+(w), by the fact that S is ω-sensible there exists v ∈ W
such that w Sn v and ψ ∈ ℓ+(v); since S is deterministic, we must forcibly have
v = Sn(w). By induction hypothesis we conclude that v ∈ JψK
ℓ
and by the
satisfaction relation it follows that w ∈ J♦ψK
ℓ
.
In case that ♦ψ ∈ ℓ−(w), observe that for all n, if ♦ψ ∈ ℓ−(Sn(w)) then
♦ψ ∈ ℓ−(Sn+1(w)); thus by induction, ♦ψ ∈ ℓ−(Sn(w)) for all n < ω. In
virtue of Definition 4.8, ψ ∈ ℓ−(Sn(w)) for all n < ω, hence by the induction
hypothesis Sn(w) 6∈ JψK, from which it follows that w 6∈ J♦ψK.
In the non-deterministic case quasimodels are not models as they stand, but
in [15], it is shown that dynamical systems can be extracted from them.
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Theorem 5. A -free formula ϕ is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of
dynamic topological systems if and only if it is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the
class of finite, sub(ϕ)-quasimodels.
Theorem 5 applies even to formulas in an extended language L♦∀ with the
universal modality, but it is shown in [15] that there are topologically falsifiable
L♦∀-formulae that are not Kripke falsifiable. As we will see, this is not the case
over L♦. Note that [15] uses quasimodels with one-sided types, but in view
of Remark 2, the theorem can easily be modified to obtain quasimodels with
two-sided types.
7.3 Restrictions on types
The reason that two-sided types are convenient is that they can easily be re-
stricted to smaller sets of formulas while maintaining the relations between
them. To make this precise, if Σ is a set of formulas, first define Ψ ↾ Σ =
(Ψ−,Ψ+ ∩Σ), and sub(Σ) =
⋃
ϕ∈Σ sub(ϕ). With this, we have the following:
Lemma 5. Let Φ,Ψ,Γ,Θ be types and Σ a set of formulas closed under sub-
formulas. Then,
1. Φ ↾ Σ is also a type;
2. if Γ ⊑T Φ 4T Ψ or Γ 4T Φ ⊑T Ψ then Γ 4T Ψ, and
3. if Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ and sub(Γ
+) ⊆ Σ, then Γ ST Ψ ↾ Σ.
Proof. To prove item 1 it is sufficient to check that the conditions of Definition 4
hold. Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 4 are straightforward. Since Φ− = (Φ ↾
Σ)−, conditions 4 and 6 clearly hold. For condition 7, suppose that ϕ → ψ ∈
(Ψ ↾ Σ)+. Since Σ is closed under subformulas, ϕ, ψ ∈ Σ and, since Ψ is a
type it follows that either ϕ ∈ Ψ− or ψ ∈ Ψ+. By definition either ϕ ∈ Ψ− or
ψ ∈ Ψ+ ∩ Σ. The proofs for conditions 3 and 5 of Definition 4 are similar and
left to the reader.
Regarding item 2 of the lemma, on one side, Γ ⊑T Φ 4T Ψ means that Γ
+ ⊆
Φ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Γ− = Φ− ⊇ Ψ−. Therefore Γ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Ψ− ⊆ Γ− so Γ 4T Ψ.
On the other side Γ 4T Φ ⊑T Ψ means by definition that Γ
+ ⊆ Ψ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and
Γ− ⊇ Φ− = Ψ−. It follows that Γ+ ⊆ Ψ+ and Ψ+ ⊆ Γ− so Γ 4T Ψ.
For item 3 we consider the conditions of Definition 6:
(a) If ◦ψ ∈ Γ+, from Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ we conclude that ◦ψ ∈ Φ
+ and ψ ∈ Ψ+.
Since sub(Γ+) ⊆ Σ then ψ ∈ Σ. Therefore ψ ∈ Ψ+ ∩ Σ so ψ ∈ (Ψ ↾ Σ)
+
.
(b) If ◦ψ ∈ Γ−, from Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ we conclude that ◦ψ ∈ Φ
− and ψ ∈ Ψ−,
which by definition means that ψ ∈ (Ψ ↾ Σ)
−
.
(c) If ♦ψ ∈ Γ+, since sub(Γ+) ⊆ Σ then ♦ψ, ψ ∈ Σ. From Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ we
conclude that ♦ψ ∈ Φ+ and either ψ ∈ Γ+ or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ+. From this it follows
that either ψ ∈ Γ+ or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ+ ∩ Σ (which means that ♦ψ ∈ (Ψ ↾ Σ)+).
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(d) If ♦ψ ∈ Γ−, from Γ ⊑T Φ ST Ψ we conclude that ♦ψ ∈ Φ
−, ψ ∈ Φ−
(thus ψ ∈ Γ−) and ♦ψ ∈ Ψ−. As a consequence it follows that ψ ∈ Γ− and
♦ψ ∈ (Ψ ↾ Σ)−.
We may also wish to ‘forget’ temporal formulas that have been realized. To
make this precise, let sup(ϕ) denote the set of super-formulas of ϕ. Say that a
formula ϕ is a temporal formula if it is of the forms ◦ψ or ♦ψ, and if Φ is a set
of formulas, say that ϕ ∈ Φ is maximal in Φ if it does not have any temporal
superformulas in Φ. Then, define Φ \ ϕ = (Φ−,Φ+ \ sup(ϕ)).
Lemma 6. Suppose that Φ ST Ψ.
1. If ◦ϕ is maximal in Φ+, then Φ ST Ψ \ ◦ϕ .
2. If ♦ϕ is maximal in Φ+ and ϕ ∈ Φ+, then Φ ST Ψ \ ♦ϕ.
Proof. We prove the first item; the second is analogous. Assuming that ◦ϕ is
maximal in Φ+, let us check that the four conditions of Definition 6 hold.
(a) If ◦θ ∈ Φ+, since Φ ST Ψ then θ ∈ Ψ
+. Moreover, since ◦θ ∈ Φ+ then
θ 6∈ sup(◦ϕ) by maximality of ◦ϕ. Therefore, θ ∈ (Ψ+ \ sup(◦ϕ)) = (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)
+
.
(b) If ◦θ ∈ Φ−, since Φ ST Ψ then θ ∈ Ψ
− = (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)
−
.
(c) If ♦θ ∈ Φ+, since Φ ST Ψ then either θ ∈ Φ
+ or ♦θ ∈ Ψ+. Moreover, since
◦ϕ is maximal in Φ+ and ♦θ ∈ Φ+, it follows that ♦θ 6∈ sup(◦ϕ). Therefore,
♦θ ∈ (Ψ+ \ sup(◦ϕ)) = (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)
+
.
(d) If ♦θ ∈ Φ−, since Φ ST Ψ is sensible then ♦θ ∈ Ψ
− = (Ψ \ ◦ϕ)
−
.
In the next section, we will use Theorem 5 and our results on two-sided types
to show that, for -free formulas, validity over the class of topological spaces
can be reduced to validity over the class of dynamic posets.
8 Conservativity of the -free fragment
Our goal for this section is to show that the temporal logics of dynamic posets
and of dynamical systems coincide with respect to -free formulas:
Theorem 6. A -free formula ϕ is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of dy-
namic posets if and only if it is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of dynamical
systems.
We will show this by ‘unwinding’ a quasimodel to produce a dynamic poset.
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8.1 Weak limit models
The unwinding procedure is similar to that in [15]. There, the points of the
‘limit model’ obtained from a quasimodel are those infinite paths satisfying all
♦-formulas in their labels. However, in order to obtain a poset rather than a
topological space, we will instead work with finite paths.
Definition 8. If Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) is a quasimodel, we say that a path (on Q)
is a sequence (wi)i<n ⊆ W such that wi S wi+1 for all i < n − 1. We define a
typed path (on Q) to be a sequence ((wi,Φi))i<n such that
(a) (wi)i<n is a path,
(b) for all i < n, Φi ⊑T ℓ(wi), and
(c) for all i < n− 1, Φi ST Φi+1.
We say that ((wi,Φi))i<n is proper if sub(Φ
+
i+1) ⊆ sub(Φ
+
i ) for all i < n − 1,
and terminal if Φ+n−1 = ∅.
Note that we allow Φi ⊑T ℓ(wi) and not only Φi = ℓ(wi). This will allow us
to use finite paths, as temporal formulas can be ‘forgotten’ once they have been
realized.
Definition 9. We define the weak limit model Q̂ of Q as follows:
1. Define Ŵ to be the set of terminal typed paths on Q together with the
empty path, which we denote ǫ.
2. For α = ((wi,Φi))i<n, β = ((vi,Ψi))i<m ∈ Ŵ , define α 4̂ β if n ≤ m and
for all i < n, wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi.
3. Define Ŝ(((wi,Φi))i<n) = ((wi+1,Φi+1))i<n−1; note that Ŝ(ǫ) = ǫ.
4. If n > 0, define ℓ̂(((wi,Φi))i<n) = Φ0. Then, set ℓ̂
−(ǫ) =
⋃
w∈W ℓ
−(w)
and ℓ̂+(ǫ) = ∅.
The structure Q̂ we have just defined is always a deterministic quasimodel.
Let us first show that it is deterministic.
Lemma 7. If Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) is a quasimodel then
(
Ŵ , 4̂, Ŝ
)
is a dynamic
poset.
Proof. We have to prove the following:
4̂ is a partial order on Ŵ : This follows easily from the fact that 4 and 4T
are both partial orders.
Ŝ is a function: This is clear since Ŝ(α) is defined by removing the first element
of α if it exists, otherwise Ŝ(α) = α, and thus Ŝ(α) is uniquely defined for all
α ∈ Ŵ .
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Ŝ is monotone: If ((wi,Φi))i<n 4̂ ((vi,Ψi))i<m, then n ≤ m and for all i < n,
wi 4 v1 and Φi 4T Ψi. If n > 0, then we also have n − 1 ≤ m − 1 and for all
i < n− 1, wi+1 4 vi+1 and Φi+1 4T Ψi+1, i.e.,
Ŝ(α) = ((wi+1,Φi+1))i<n−1 4̂ ((vi+1,Ψi+1))i<m−1 = Ŝ(β),
as needed. If n = 0 then α = ǫ, so that Ŝ(α) = ǫ and clearly ǫ 4̂ β.
8.2 Constructing terminal paths
Next, we must show that Q̂ has ‘enough’ paths. First we show that we can
iterate the forward-confluence property.
Lemma 8. If Q is a quasimodel, ((wi,Φi))i<n is a typed path in Q, and w0 4 v0,
then there is a typed path ((vi,Ψi))i<n such that wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi for all
i < n.
Proof. First we find vi by induction on i; v0 is already given, and once we
have found vi, we use forward confluence to choose vi+1 so that vi S vi+1 and
wi+1 4 vi+1. Then we set Ψi = ℓ(vi); since S is sensible, Ψi ST Ψi+1, and by
Lemma 5.2, Φn 4T Ψn.
We want to prove that any point can be included in a terminal typed path.
For this we will first show that we can work mostly with properly typed paths,
thanks to the following.
Lemma 9. Let Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) be a quasimodel, (wi)i<n be a path on W , and
Φ0 ⊑ ℓ(w0). Then there exist (Φi)i<n such that ((wi,Φi))i<n is a properly typed
path.
Proof. For i < n − 1 define recursively Φi+1 = ℓ(wi+1) ↾ sub(Φ
+
i ); by the
assumption that S is sensible and Lemma 5, (Φi,Φi+1) is sensible for each
i < n− 1. It is easy to see that ((wi,Φi))i<n thus defined is proper.
However, the properly typed paths we have constructed need not be terminal.
This will typically require extending them to a long-enough path, as we do below.
Lemma 10. If Q is a quasimodel, then any non-empty typed path on Q can be
extended to a terminal path.
Proof. Let Q = (W,4, S, ℓ) and α = ((wi,Φi))i<m be any typed path on Q. For
a type Φ, define ‖Φ‖ = |sub(Φ+)|. We proceed to prove the claim by induction
on ‖Φm−1‖. Consider first the case where Φ
+
m−1 contains no temporal formulas;
that is, formulas of the form ◦ψ or ♦ψ for some ψ. In this case, using the seriality
of S choose wm such that wm−1 S wm, and define Φm+1 = (ℓ
−(wm);∅); it is
easy to see that ((wi,Φi))i≤m is a terminal path.
Otherwise, let ϕ be a maximal temporal formula of Φ+m−1, i.e., it does not
appear as a proper subformula of any other temporal formula in Φ+m−1. We
consider two sub-cases.
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Assume first that ϕ = ◦ψ. Then, by the seriality of S, we may choose wm so
thatwm−1 S wm. Applying Lemma 9, let Φ˜m be such that ((wm−1,Φm−1), (wm, Φ˜m))
is a properly typed path. Setting Φm = Φ˜m \ ◦ψ, we see by Lemma 6.1 that
((wm−1,Φm−1), (wm,Φm))
is a properly typed path, and ‖Φm‖ < ‖Φm−1‖, since the left-hand side does
not count ◦ψ. Thus we may apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a terminal
typed path ((wi,Φi))i<n extending α.
Now consider the case where ϕ = ♦ψ. Since S is ω-sensible, there is a path
wm−1 S wm S . . . S wk
so that ϕ ∈ ℓ(wk). Using the seriality of S, choose wk+1 so that wk S wk+1.
By Lemma 9, there are types Φi for m ≤ i ≤ k and a type Φ˜k+1 such that
((wm−1,Φm−1), . . . , (wk,Φk), (wk+1, Φ˜k+1))
is a properly typed path. Then, define Φk+1 = Φ˜k+1 \ ♦ψ. Using Lemma 6
we see that (Φk,Φk+1) is sensible; moreover, ‖Φk+1‖ < ‖Φm−1‖. Hence we can
apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a terminal typed path ((wi,Φi))i<n
extending α.
8.3 From weak limit models to models
With this, we are ready to show that our unwinding is indeed a deterministic
quasimodel.
Lemma 11. If Q is a quasimodel, then Q̂ is a deterministic quasimodel.
Proof. Let Q = (W,4, S, ℓ). We have already seen in Lemma 7 that (Ŵ , 4̂, Ŝ)
is a dynamic poset, so it remains to check that (Ŵ , 4̂, ℓ̂) is a labelled frame and
Ŝ is sensible and ω-sensible. Let α =
(
(wi,Φi)
)
i<n
∈ Ŵ .
First we must check that if α 4̂ β, then ℓ̂(α) 4T ℓ̂(β). Consider two cases;
if n > 0, then β is also of the form (vi,Ψi)i<m with m > 0 and by definition,
ℓ̂(α) = Φ0 4T Ψ0 = ℓ̂(β). Otherwise, α = ǫ, and it is clear from the definition
of ℓ̂(ǫ) that ℓ̂(ǫ) 4T ℓ̂(β) regardless of β.
Now assume that ϕ→ ψ ∈ ℓ̂−(α). If n > 0, then since Q is a labeled frame,
we can pick v0 < w0 with ϕ ∈ ℓ
+(v0) and ψ ∈ ℓ
−(v0). Since Φ0 ⊑T ℓ(w0) 4T
ℓ(v0), by Lemma 5.2, Φ0 4T ℓ(v0), so that by Lemma 8, there is a typed path
β′ = ((vi,Ψi))i<n with Ψ0 = ℓ(v0) such that wi 4 vi and Φi 4T Ψi for all i < n.
By Lemma 10, we can extend β′ to a terminal path β. Then, it is easy to see
that α 4̂ β, ϕ ∈ ℓ̂+(β), and ψ ∈ ℓ̂−(β), as required.
To check that every pair in Ŝ is sensible, consider two cases. If Ŝ(α) 6= ǫ,
then α has length at least two, but since α is a typed path,
ℓ̂(α) = Φ0 ST Φ1 = ℓ̂
(
Ŝ(α)
)
.
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Otherwise, Ŝ(α) = ǫ; this means that either α = ǫ and thus ℓ̂+(α) = ∅, or α
has length 1, in which case since α is terminal, so we also have that ℓ̂+(α) = ∅.
In either case, there can be no temporal formula in ℓ̂+(α). Now, if ◦ϕ ∈ ℓ̂−(α),
then ◦ϕ ∈ ℓ−(w) for some w ∈ W , hence ϕ ∈ ℓ−S(v) for any v with w S v
(which exists since S is serial), and thus ϕ ∈ ℓ̂−(ǫ). Similarly, if ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ̂−(α),
then by Definition 4.8 ϕ ∈ ℓ−(α), so that ϕ ∈ ℓ̂−(ǫ).
Finally we check that Ŝ is ω-sensible. Suppose that ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ+(α). This means
that α 6= ǫ, so α is terminal, and hence n > 0 and ♦α 6∈ Φn−1. But this is only
possible if ϕ ∈ Φi for some i < n− 1, in which case ϕ ∈ ℓ̂
(
Ŝi(α)
)
.
Let us put all of our work together to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose that ϕ ∈ L♦ is satisfied (falsified) on a dynamical
topological model. Then, by Theorem 5, ϕ is satisfied (falsified) on some point
w∗ of a sub(ϕ)-quasimodel Q = (W,4, S, ℓ). By Lemma 11, Q̂ is a deterministic
quasimodel, and by Lemma 10, (w∗, ℓ(w∗)) can be extended to a terminal path
α∗ ∈ Ŵ . By Lemma 4, α∗ satisfies (falsifies) ϕ on the dynamic poset model
(Ŵ , 4̂, Ŝ, J·Kℓ̂).
9 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a natural ‘minimalist’ intuitionistic temporal logic, ITL0,
along with possible extensions including Fischer Servi or constant domain ax-
ioms. We have seen that relational semantics validate the constant domain ax-
iom, leading us to consider a wider class of models based on topological spaces,
with a novel interpretation for ‘henceforth’ based on invariant neighbourhoods.
With this, we have shown that the logics ITL0, ITLCD, ITLFS and ITL1 are
sound for the class of all dynamical systems, of all dynamical posets, of all open
dynamical systems, and of all persistent dynamical posets, respectively, which
we have used in order to prove that the logics are pairwise distinct.
Of course this immediately raises the question of completeness, which we
have not addressed. Specifically, the following are left open.
Question 1. Are ITL0 and ITL0 complete for the class of dynamical systems?
Question 2. Are ITLCD, ITL0♦ and ITL
CD
 complete for the class of dynamic
posets?
Question 3. Are ITLFS, ITLFS♦ and ITL
FS
 complete for the class of open
dynamical systems?
Question 4. Are ITL1, ITL1♦ and ITL
1
 complete for the class of persistent
dynamic posets?
Note that by Theorem 6, ITL0♦ is complete for the class of dynamical sys-
tems if and only if it is complete for the class of dynamic posets, so thanks to
the results we have shown here, proving topological completeness would give us
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Kripke completeness for free. It is likely that the techniques employed in [16],
also based on non-deterministic quasimodels, could be adapted to the intuition-
istic setting to obtain such a result. The completeness of ITLFS and ITL1 is
likely to be a more difficult problem, as in these cases it is not even known if
the set of valid formulas is computably enumerable.
Question 5. Are the sets of formulas of L, L♦, or L valid over the class of
all persistent dynamic posets computably enumerable?
Question 6. Are the sets of formulas of L, L♦, or L valid over the class of
all open dynamical systems computably enumerable?
In both cases a negative answer is possible, since that is the case for their
classical counterparts [25]. Nevertheless, the proofs of non-axiomatizability in
the classical case do not carry over to the intuitionistic setting in an obvious
way, and these remain challenging open problems.
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